A new measure of indirect shareholding is proposed and estimated for Japan's six major keiretsu groups. For these groups indirect shareholding by each firm in each other firm is about one fourth as great as direct shareholding on average. Where there are gains to firms from holding stock in other firms, there are also gains from indirect stockholding. Alignment of the firms into groups maximizes indirect shareholding.
Many of the largest corporations in Japan are affiliated with one or
another of six business groups, the modern counterparts of the pre-war zaibatsu. The firms affiliated with any one group are linked to one another by a complicated web of interlocking stockholding. Recent inquiries have identified economic rationales for one firm to hold shares in another. But direct shareholding links between pairs of firms need not align the firms into groups. Perhaps the economic rationale for the groups is in assuring that whatever bilateral shareholding interlocks are formed will also induce the greatest possible indirect shareholding among the same set of firms. Indirect shareholding exists when a company holds stock in a company that itself holds stock in another company. Whatever advantages reside in direct shareholding links are apt also to be present in the case of indirect shareholding.
In this short note I propose a new measure of indirect shareholding, and describe estimates of the measure for Japanese keiretsu affilates using 1980 data.
Measuring indirect shareholding
In this section I will propose a measure of indirect shareholding. The strategy is to characterize hypothetical bilateral shareholding ties between a pair of firms that, by themselves, would have the same influence on the two firms' choices of control variables as the more complicated web of indirect as *Banks in Japan hold stock in the companies to which they lend to reduce the agency costs of dobt (Shoard, 1089; Hath, 1900; Prowse ,1990, and Hoslii, Kashyap, and Scharfstein, 1991). Also companies acquire stock in rivals to achieve cartelization (Flath; forthcoming-a, and forthcoming-b). Crossshareholding interlocks between trading partners can be to attain vertical integration (Flath, 1989) or to bond firms to observe contractual stipulations (Flath, 1991 
Conclusion
Firms hold stock in other firms for a variety of reasons including vertical integration, contract enforcement, cartelization, lowering the costs of financial intermediation and more. All have been offered as explanations for cross-shareholding which is prominent in Japan but also observed elsewhere.
Where direct shareholding is advantageous so is indirect shareholding.
The greatest extent of cross-shareholding in Japan is that linking firms that are members of a same business group. Alignment of firms into groups maYimi7PS thp pyfpnt nf inrh'rprt. sharnhnlHing t.hnt. rnsnlt.s from any rlirer.t.
shareholding. By proposing and estimating a measure of indirect shareholding I have argued that indirect shareholding in the keiretsu groups, particularly indirect shareholding by keiretsu banks, is indeed large enough to be a plausible motivation for the groups' very existence.
